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privileged. Blakeslee v. Carroll, 64 Conn. 223, 29 Atl. 473.
Cases similar to this have not arisen heretofore in West Virginia, the nearest being Johnson v. Brown, 13 W. Va. 71,
which states that libelous matters published in due course
of legal procedure are not actionable, if the court in which
they were published had jurisdiction of the cause and they
were pertinent tc the suit. The rule does not apply to a
tribunal which is not judicial or quasi-judicial in its character or nature. 36 C. J. 1251. There is no definite line
of demarcation between those boards and commissions
which are quasi-judicial and those which are not. The
difficulty in determining whether a given body is or is not
a quasi-judicial tribunal explains much of the apparent conflict of authority. In view, of the fact that the plaintiff in
the principal case concedes that the Compensation Commissioner acts in a quasi-judicial capacity the case seems to
be correct.
-Fred L. Davis
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE--DEGREES OF.-Plaintiff's decedent
with others was engaged in repairing a highway on which
defendant was driving an automobile at a rate of speed
variously estimated from twenty to sixty miles per hour.
Defendant had passed a warning and danger sign a thousand feet before her car struck plaintiff's decedent and
killed him. Held, that "in cases of such extraordinary
hazard and danger the rule of reasonable care applicable
in other cases is incomplete; a greater degree of care
should be enforced, and a workman so at work on the
public road has a right to rely on that degree of care by
operators thereon which will protect him from injury * * *
*." Chaney v. Moore, 101 W. Va. 621, 134 S. E. 204.
There was a time when the courts were pretty generally
committed to the doctrine of degrees, of care and corresponding degrees of negligence. Such adjectives as ordinary,
great and utmost, were used to describe the care required,
While negligence was divided into dlight, ordinary and
gross. There is still respectable authority for these distinctions among the decisions, and some statutes require them.
However, decisions o:6 present day courts show a marked
bend aWay from such distinctions. They lay down a variable rule of ordinary care, which is defined as that care
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exercised by the ordinarily prudent man under the same
or similar circumstances, and the absence of it is negligence.
Courts that have departed from the old rule contend that
nothing is to be gained by following it except confusion for
the jury. The advantage claimed for this modern standard of care is that the minds of the jury are relieved from
the mystifying task of making hair splitting distinctions as
to care and negligence, and then refitting them into their
"* * * What is reasonable care
respective compartments.
must depend upon the circumstances of each particular
case. It is, however, inaccurate to say, as many of the
cases do, that the degree of care varies with the particular
circumstances. It is only reasonable care which is required
in any case; but the greater the danger * * * * the more
precautions and the closer vigilance reasonable care requires." That is, circumstances change but noti the standard of care. 13 AM. & ENG. ENCY. LAW (2nd ed.) 416; CASES
ON TORTS, AMES & SMITH (Pound's ed.) 77, 79n, 82n, 83, 85n;
HUTCHINSON, CARRIERS (3rd ed.) §§893-8; SHERMAN &
REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE (6th ed.) §§47-8; 2 COOLEY, TORTS
(3rd ed.) 1324-7; CHAPIN, TORTS, 523-8; 20 R. C. L.
21-22, 24-28, 51; 29 Cyc. 422-24, 426-27, 460-1; 1 THOMPSON, NEGLIGENCE §§18-26; BURDICK, LAW OF TORTS, 2021, 510-13. The West Virginia Court has repeatedly
used expressions in accord with this rule. Washington v.
B. & 0., 17 W. Va. 190; Dimmey v. Rwy. Co. 27 W. Va. 32;
55 Am. Rep. 292 (1885) ; Berng v. Coal Co., 27 W. Va. 285,
55 Am. Rep. 304n (1885); Gunn v. River R'd Co., 36 W. Va.
165, 172, 14 S. E. 465; Graham v. Newberg 0. C. & C. Co., 38
W. Va. 273, 278, 18 S. E. 584; Dickem v. Salt & Coal Co., 41
W. Va. 511, 23 S. E. 582; Baker v. R. R. Co., 51 W. Va. 423
at 425, 41 S. E. 148; Meeks v. Rwy. Co., 52 W. Va. 99, 43 S. E.
118; Mormile v. Traction Co., 57 W. Va. 132, 49 S. E. 1030;
Ritter v. Hicks, 102 W. Va. 541, 544-5, 135 S. E. 601. In Fowler v. B. & 0., 18 W. Va. 583 (1818) ordinary care was defined
in accord with the rule set out above and casea since have
approved the rule of reasonable or ordinary care. Moorefield
v. Lewis, 96 W. Va. 112, 123 S. E. 564; Blackwood v. Traction
Co., 96 W. Va. 1, 125 S. E. 350. Other cases have said that
more than ordinary care is required. Deputy v. Kimmel, 73 W.
Va. 595, 80 S. E. 919; Glinco v. Wimer, 79 W. Va. 669, 92 S. E.
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112. Reasonable care has also been defined as that which the
reasonable or prudent man would do on his own premises.
Snyder v. P. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 11 W. Va. 14; Keyser Canning
Co. v. Klots Co., 98 W. Va. 487, 128 S. E. 280. In another
rather large group of cases some of the words used to describe the necessary care have been,. "high," "very high or
highest,"- "highest possible," "very great," "necessary care
and prudence," "reasonable precaution," etc. Runyan v. Light
Co., 68 W. Va. 609, 71 S. E. 259; Love v. Power Co., 86 W.
Va. 393, 103 S. E. 352; Fisher v. Coal Co., 86 W. Va. 460,
103 S. E. 359; Merril v. Torpedo Co., 79 W. Va. 669, 92 S. E.
112; Thomas v. Electric Co., 54 W. Va. 395, 46 S. E. 217;
Snyder v. Elec. Co., 43 W. Va. 661, 28 S. E. 733. As authority for the principal case the court relied principally on
Deputy v. Kimmel, 73 W. Va. 595, 80 S. E. 819. In the third
point of the syllabus of that; case the court says, "Because
of the character of the vehicle and the unusual dangers
incident to its use, a greater degree of care is required of
the operator of an automobile while on the public highway, and especially at street crossings, than is required ol
persons using the ordinary or less dangerous instruments of
travel. He shoald exercise such care in respect to speed,
warnings of approach and the management of the car as
will enable him to anticipate and avoid collisions which the
nature of the machine and the locality may reasonably
suggest likely to occur in the absence of such precautions."
In the body of that opinion this language is used, "Both
(the driver and other users of the road) must exercise such
care as reasonably prudent persons would exercise under
the same circumstances and conditions, in order to avoid being injured or causing injury." Toward the end of the
opinion in the principal case this language is found, "'The
driver of an automobile on the public highway is guilty of
actionable negligence if he fails to exercise that degree of
cars which he ought to observe under the particular circumstances in which he is placed." The court has said that
the syllabus rather than the opinion states the law.
Bank v. Burdette, 61 W. Va. 636, 637, 57 S.. E. 53. If the
language of the fourth point of the syllabus in the principal case is to be taken to mean what the plain import of
the language Would lead us to believe it does mean, auto-
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mobile drivers are virtually insurers of persons working on
the highway. In a situation such as was found in the principal case the court says ordinary care is not enough and
that degree of care is necessary which will protect the
workman from injury. In short a driver of an autdmobile
must proceed at his peril if there are workmen on the highway. In the absence of statute the doctrine of absolute
liability is very narrow. BURDICK, LAW OF TORTS, 536-46.
Apparently the court would not apply the doctrine of the
principal case except in situations of extreme hazard. But
just how much must the situation change in order to necessitate the adoption of another standard of care? While
the doctrine according to the principal case is confined to
cases of automobile drivers on the one hand and workmen
on the highway on the other, one cannot help sensing the
possibility of its extension. The pronouncement seems unfortunate, especially since what is no doubt a correct result
could have been reached by applying the standard of care
of the reasonable man under the circumstances.
-Arlos Jackson Harbert.
INSUFFICIENT SUPPLY OF GAS AS
PUBLIC UTILITIES GROUND FOR RELIEF FROM DUTY OF NATURAL GAS COMPANY
TO SUPPLY AN APPLICANT'FOR SERVICE.-A and B are natural
gas companies located in same territory. C is a brick
company. B had been, and is, furnishing C with adequate
supply of gas, but at a higher rate than that charged by
A, whose principal market is in Ohio and Kentucky. C
seeks to compel A to furnish it with supply of gas, in order
to get benefit of A's lower rate. From an order of the
Public Service Commission requiring A to furnish C with
a supply of gas, A appeals to the Supreme Court of Appeals, and B intervenes in order to protect its interest as a
public service corporation. Held, to compel a public utility
corporation at great expense to duplicate another's satisfactory supply of gas, not called for by circumstances,
wpuld be improper, and the court will annul an unreasonable order of the Public Service Commission requiring
duplication of service of supplying gas. United Fuel Gas
Company v. Public Service Commission, et al., 138 S. E. 388
(W. Va. 1927). Hatcher, Pres., and Woods, J, dissented.
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